The existing literature on the Tutsi rebels in several aspects, is actually misinformation or disinformation put out by the rebels or their enemies during this conflict to garner international support in their respective reasons for the conflict. Does it explore the capacity if any, of the rebels' anticipation about the costs of their challenge or the hope for forthcoming international intervention? If anything the information at hand focuses solely on the rebels first invasion, not looking at their later actions on the battlefield or peace negotiations that incited the genocidal retaliation.
These succeeding actions include: launching military offensives in 1991 and 1992; refusing to compromise during peace negotiations in 1992 and 1993; breaking a cease-fire and launching an offensive in early 1993. This angered even their allies within Rwanda; refusing to renegotiate the terms of an existing peace agreement in late 1993 in spite of increasing signs that such refusal would lead to massive retaliation against Tutsi civilians. Refusing to accept cease-fire offers during the first two weeks of the genocide and pursuing a war plan during the genocide giving greater priority to military victory than to protecting Tutsi civilians.
This comes from former senior Tutsi rebels who are more than willing to speak openly more now than during the war or it's immediate aftermath. These include the following:
Founding coordinator and later constitutional commission chairman, Tito Rutaremara
Vice-chairman at the time of the invasion and later electoral commission president, Protais Musoni
Director of external affairs and top peace negotiator during the war and later foreign minister, Patrick Maimaka.
Deputy peace negotiator and later cheif of cabinet, Theogene Rudasingwa.
Top delegate to peace talks in 1991 and director of war operations during the genocide and later chief of army operations, Karenzi Karake.
Top delegate to the first peace talks in 1990 and later deputy police commissioner, Dennis Karera.
Head of finance from it's founding through the genocide and later prefect of the capital area, Aloysie Inyumba.
Washington representative during the war and later foreign minister, Charles Murigande.
Personal physician and right hand man of it's leader Paul Kagame and later national security advisor, Emmanuel Ndahiro.
Member of the executive committee and later minister of information, Wilson "Shaban" Rutaysire.
An anonymous top rebel and later senior official in the ministry of defense.
An anonymous senior moderate Hutu officer in the Rwandan army during the genocide.
All quotes and historical accounts are from interviews made by Alan Kuperman except where otherwise noted.
Some historical background in colonial and pre-colonial next time.
These succeeding actions include: launching military offensives in 1991 and 1992; refusing to compromise during peace negotiations in 1992 and 1993; breaking a cease-fire and launching an offensive in early 1993. This angered even their allies within Rwanda; refusing to renegotiate the terms of an existing peace agreement in late 1993 in spite of increasing signs that such refusal would lead to massive retaliation against Tutsi civilians. Refusing to accept cease-fire offers during the first two weeks of the genocide and pursuing a war plan during the genocide giving greater priority to military victory than to protecting Tutsi civilians.
This comes from former senior Tutsi rebels who are more than willing to speak openly more now than during the war or it's immediate aftermath. These include the following:
Founding coordinator and later constitutional commission chairman, Tito Rutaremara
Vice-chairman at the time of the invasion and later electoral commission president, Protais Musoni
Director of external affairs and top peace negotiator during the war and later foreign minister, Patrick Maimaka.
Deputy peace negotiator and later cheif of cabinet, Theogene Rudasingwa.
Top delegate to peace talks in 1991 and director of war operations during the genocide and later chief of army operations, Karenzi Karake.
Top delegate to the first peace talks in 1990 and later deputy police commissioner, Dennis Karera.
Head of finance from it's founding through the genocide and later prefect of the capital area, Aloysie Inyumba.
Washington representative during the war and later foreign minister, Charles Murigande.
Personal physician and right hand man of it's leader Paul Kagame and later national security advisor, Emmanuel Ndahiro.
Member of the executive committee and later minister of information, Wilson "Shaban" Rutaysire.
An anonymous top rebel and later senior official in the ministry of defense.
An anonymous senior moderate Hutu officer in the Rwandan army during the genocide.
All quotes and historical accounts are from interviews made by Alan Kuperman except where otherwise noted.
Some historical background in colonial and pre-colonial next time.
2 comments:
At least they are beginning to talk and that may shed some light on a situation I've never really understood. This is a great series, Ettatose!
A. thank you so very much. I am beginning to see what the reasons are for this senseless slaughter. Stay tuned March 8th for My post on FGM.
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